Bullion
Volume 32

Number 3

Article 2

9-2008

Consolidated supervision of Banks: Concept and practices
U. Kama
Central Bank of Nigeria

Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.cbn.gov.ng/bullion
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, Economics Commons, Finance and Financial Management
Commons, and the Other Business Commons

Recommended Citation
Ukama, U. (2008). Banking, Banking supervision, Corporate governance and Risk management. CBN
Bullion. 32(3), 17-24.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CBN Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Bullion by an authorized editor of CBN Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact
dc@cbn.gov.ng.

Volume 32, No. 3

July - Sept. 2008

CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION OF BAI{I(S:
CONCEPTSAND PRACTICES
BY
U.

Ken '

concems are easily accentuated by

information asymmetry between
home and host country supervisors.
These supervisory challenges can be
addressed by taking a consolidated
viewof risk.

+"

One of the requirements of the Basle

Core Principles for Effective Banking
Supervision is that supervision should
be canied out on a consolidated

basis. This implies that bank
supervisors should take cognizance

of the overall risks of the banking

group when applying their
supervisory methods.

U. Kama

1.0

Consolidated supervision of banks is
therefore a comprehensive approach

to

lntroduc'tion

The revolution in information

and
communication technology as well as

the widespread intemalization of
business/banking operations has
resulted in the existence of mmplex
group structures. The development
has equally led to the emergence of

complex business/financial

institutions that transcend countries'
borders. lnherent in such group
structure, however, is the relationship

between parent and subsidiary

companies, and those inter-company

relationships which allow one
company to exercise significant
influence over

a second

company,

without having actual control. ln such
group structures, a supervised entity
might belong to a group headed by a
holding company/parent entity that, in

tum, might also have several other
subsidiaries and affiliates.

ln many countries, banks are not
stand-alone institutions but are rather
a part of a group. lt is possible that a
holding company can transfer capital,
assets, and liabilities positions among
its affiliated entities, including foreign
subsidiaries. lf these positions are not
treated on a qonsolidated basis, they
may pose considerable risks to

a

bank. Some concerns are also caused
by complex financial institutions active
in a number of jurisdictions. These
Mr

banking supervision which

evaluates the strength of a group or

financial conglomerate to which a

bank belongs.

lt takes into

consideration the risks of the entire
group or financial conglomerate,

including direct subsidiaries and
branches, and also non-bank
companies and other financial
affiliates to which a bank belongs

notwithstanding whether those risks

are booked by the bank or

ln Nigeria, the adoption of universal
banking in 2001 brought about
ad d itiona I challenges to the
Regulatory Authorities. Under the
scheme, banks are allowed to
undertake various financial services
which cut across both money and
capital markets as well as insurance
and mortgage businesses. ln addition,
the recently concluded banking sector

consolidation programme through
mergers & acquisitions and the
increased capitalization of banks have
resulted in the emergence of bigger
banks. These developments have led
to increased competition within the
sectorand heightened banks' appetite

to

become internationally active,

particularly within the WestAfrican sub
region and beyond. Consequently,
financial institutions in Nigeria have

expanded their activities, often
through subsidiaries beyond their
tradilional areas of operation.
Financial groupings have thus
emerged, combin ing banking,
insurance, pension funds, discount
houses, finance companies, primary

mortgage institutions, micro-finance
banks and securities businesses.

not.

Specifically, it refers to a group-wide
approach to supervision whereby all
the risk run by banking/financial

groups are considered. lt may,
therefore, be defined as an overall
evaluation, both quantitatively and

qualitatively, ofthe strength ofa group
to which a bank belongs, in order to

assess the potential impact of other

The above developments have led to a

rs.appraisal of the solo approach to

supervision and

its capability

in

addressing contagion risks, complex
group structures as well as the

arbitrage opportunities usually

created by differing regulations and
s u pervis ion standards among
s u pe rvisory agencies. The

group companies on the bank.

supervision of related entities on "solo

However, while consolidated
supervision is undoubtedly an

dencies that exist within groups.

essential element of effective bank

supervision, it should not be regarded
as an alternative to the normal
supervision of individual licensed
banks. Rather, it should be seen as

basis' obscures the interdepenAgainst the background of the
foregoing, this paper examines the
conceptual issues and practices of

complementing the supervision of
banks on a "solo" basis, and very
frequently supervisors can apply the
same techniques of fina n cia I

consolidated supervision. lt discusses
the experiences in some selected
jurisdictions, the relevance of adopting
the supervisory approach in Nigeria as
well as the issues and challenges
involved in its implementation.

assessment and regulation on both a
consolldated and an unconsolidated
basis.

The paper is divided into six sections.
Following this introduction is section ll
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which examines the conceptual and

theoretical issues

in

consolidated
supervision. Section lll reviews the
experience of otherjurisdictions in the
practice of consolidated supervision.

ln

section lV, the relevance of

adopting consolidated supervision in

the Nigerian banking sector is
highlighted, while the challenges of
consolidated supervision is x-rayed in
section V. The conclusion is made in
section Vl ofthe paper.

2,0

Conceptual/Theoretical
lssues in Consolidated
Supervision

2.1

Conceptual lssues

There are major concepts

in
consolidated supervision. There are
q ua ntitative and qualitative
supervisions.

2.1,1

Quantitative consolidated
Supervision

The quantitative consolidated
supervision is based on consolidated

frnancial returns, reflecting an
accounting consolidation of the
licensed entity with parts or the whole

of the group to which the entity
belongs. The consolidated prudential
repo(s allow supervisors to monitor

several aspects

of the

financial

condition of banking groups on a

t

and
Disclosure Requirements

?.1.3 Solo- plus

Consolidated

Solo-plus supervision approach
focuses on individual group entities.
lndividual entities are supervised on

solo basis according to the capital
requirements of their respective
regulators. The solo supervision of

This entails the collection, review and

analysis of information for the
purpose of assessing the financial
condition and strength of a banking
group to which a bank belongs. The
qualitative assessment of a banking
group involves issues such as listed
below which should be thoroughly

examined

to obtain a full

understanding of the practices in the
Banking Group:

.:.
.t
t
.!.
.!
.i.
.:.
*
.t

Group Legal Structure ;
Capital Resources;
Transparency ofthe Group;

CorporateGovernance;
Fit and ProperTests;

Risk Management Practices;

ControlEnvironment:
Group Management Structure;
Structure of Business Activities;

typical

bank with subsidiary companies
engaged in a range of more
2.1.4.2 Mixed-activity Group or
Mixed Conglomerates:

This is one which controls

quantitative group-wide assessment
ofthe adequacy ofthe capital.

important factor behind the
emergence of mixed activity groups

2.1.4

of capital required for

has been the relatively large amounts

CorporateGroupings:

The concept of Corporate Groupings

gained prominence

in the

global
environment due to the emergence of

complex grou p structures. This
phenomenon arose from the
deregulation and libe ra lization,
increasing wave of globalization and
advances
inf ormation and
communications technology, leading

in

to the

emergence

of

complex

business/fi nancial developments that

transcend countries' borders. The
broad corporate groupings can be
classified asfollows:

2.1.4.'l Banking Group:
licensed bank establishes or acquires
subsidiary companies which carry on

Supervision

A

the group as a whole and, usually, by a

individual entities is complemented by

a general qualitative assessmenl of

A banking group exists whenever a

Consolidated

licensed bank.

commercial and industrial companies
as well as banks. Specifically; it is any
group of companies offering not only
financial services but also nonflnancial or commercial services. An

group capital adequacy and large

2.1.2 Qualitative

a

banking group consists of a licensed

subsidiary banks (MacDonald,'l 998).

Supervision:

quantitative basis. Examples include
exposures, among others.

than

banking or quasi-banking/financial
activities. Many different factors-

legal, regulatory commercial or fiscal-

may determine the decision of the
bank to operate through subsidiary
companies. In some countries, banks
are prohibited by law, prudential

regulations or their own articles of
association from investing in the
shares of commercial and industrial
companies. As a general rule, banks
tend to invest only in other companies

which carry on banking or quasibanking financial activities for
example, money transfers, leasing or
trading in securilies. Thus, a typical
banking group might consist of a
licensed bank with su bs id ia ry
companies engaged in a range of
specialized financial activities and
possibly one or more subsidiary

banks and other companies

established in foreign countries. ln
some cases the group might be
headed by a holding company rather
IE

the

establishment of new banks. ln many

countries,- particularly developing
countries, and the countries of
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union- shortage of savings has
meant that very oflen large industrial
or commercial concerns have been

the only institutions capable

of

providing the initial amounts of capital
which the establishment of new
banks requires. ln other countries
large commercial companies have

also diversified into commercial
services: for example, large food
retailing companies in the United

Kingdom have seen opportunities to
exploit their lT systems and network
ofoutlets by offering banking services
to their existing customer base.
Whatever its origin, it is worth noting
that a mixed activity group may often
contain a sub- group of banks and

other financial companies which
operates as a single entity. Looked at
in isolation, such a banking sub-

group

is

little different from the

banking groups described above.

2.1.4.3 Financial Conglomerates:
Th

is

applies

to a ny

g ro u

p

of

companies engaged in banking and

related activities. Put differently, it
means any group of companies under

common control whose exclusive or

predominant activities consist of
providing significant services in at
least two different financial sectors
(banking, securities, insurance,
discount houses, pension funds, etc)
The term 'financial conglomerate"
looks like a suitable description to
apply to any group (or sub- group) of
companies engaged in banking and
related activities. However, within the
field of financial regulation, the term
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has acquired
meaning.

ln
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a

more technical

essence, "financial
conglomerate" has come to mean a
group which engages in a range of
different financial activities which
were traditionally kept separate- and
are still kept separate- by law or

regulation in many countries. The
activities in question are banking,
trading in securities and insurance.

Since 1993 joint committees
established by the Basle Committee,

the Technical Committee of the
lnternational Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) and

the lnternational Association

of

lnsurance Supervisors have studied a
range of the issues related to the

supervision of such groups (for
example, the assessment of overall
capital adequacy). ln the course ofthis
work they have defined the term
"linancial conglomerate" to mean "any

group of companies under common

control whose exclusive or

predominant activities consist of
providing significant services in at
least two different financial sectors
(banking, securities, and insurance)."
Itwill be readily appreciated that many

consolidation is mainly a mechanical
process of aggregating the assets
and liabilities of the regulated entities

into a consolidated balance sheet,
while consolidated supervision entails
more holistic and group wide
approach of supervision, covering

a

both qualitative and quantitative
evaluation of the operations and the

attendant risks of related entities.
Although, consolidated accounting
might be inappropriate when the
nature of the business or risks is

2.1.4.4 Bank Holding Company
This is an institution that exercises
control over a bank(s) and non-bank
financial institutions categorized as its
subsidiaries.

2.1.4.5 Parent Bank:
This refers to a bank that has one or
more subsidiaries.

professional requirements. Methods
of accounting consolidation could be

either'full line-by-line",'equity
method" or "proportional
consolidation" using relevant

lnternational Accounting Standards
(lAS) t25, 27, 28 31 and 391. For
instance, IAS No.27 and 28 provide
for consolidated linancial statements

and accounting for investments

in

subsidiaries and associates.

and Accounting
Consolidation

This literature provides

a

clear
distinction between consolidated
su

pe

rvision and accounting

co n so lid

a

tio

n.

Acco

unt

in g

and its overall financial

health

lnformation Sharing and Home

A key

component of consolidated
supervision is establishing contact
and information exchange with the
various other supervisors involved,
including host country supervisory
authorities as indicated in the Basel
Core Principles for Effective Banking
Supervision. This contact should
commence at the authorization stage
when the host supervisor should seek
approval from the home supervisor

This includes the ability to review both
banking and non-banking activities

before issuing license. ln many cases,
bilateral arrangements exist between
supervisors. These arrangements can
prove helpful in defining the scope of
information to be shared and the
conditions under which such sharing
would normally be expected. Home
country supervisors have the right to
gather information from their cross-

organization, either directly or

order for home country supervisors to

Theoretical lssues

to supervise the
consolidated banking organization.
supervisors

conducted by the banking

indirectly (through subsidiaries and
affiliates), and activities conducted at
both domestic and foreign offices
(Song, 2004). The Basel Core
Principles for Effective Banking
Supervision stipulate that banking
supervisors must practice global
consolidated supervision over their
internationally active banking
organizations, adequately monitoring
and applying appropriate prudential
norms to all aspects of the business
conducted by these ban king
organizations woddwide, primarily at
their foreign branches, joint ventures,
and subsidiaries.

2.1.5 Consolidated Supervision

ownership and corporate governance
structure, risk management systems
and all material risks within the group

Host Relationships

An essential element of banking
supervision is the ability of the

paper.

supervisor should not only be aware
but also be capable of appraising the

is often
governed by statutory and
Accounting consolidation

2.2

considered within the context of
consolidated supervision of banks.
However, issues relating to financial
conglomerates which do not include
banks lie outside the scope of this

irms. Effective con solidated
supervision requires that the
f

condition.

banking groups- for example, those

there is mnsiderable overlap between
the issues relating to the supervision
of banking groups. These issues are

process whereby supervisory
institutions evaluate the activities of a
bank or non-bank flnancial group,
including subsidiaries, associates and
afiiliates of financial and non-financial

markedly different, such risks should
not be ignored.

formed in countries in which banks are
allowed to own securities companies-

also fall within this definition of
"financial conglomerate", and that

is a

Consolidated supervision involves
evaluating the strength of the entire
banking group by taking into account
all the risks that may affect a bank,
regardless of whether these risks are
carried in the books of the bank or
related entities (MacDonald, 1998). lt

l9

border banking establishments. ln

practice consolidated supervision
effectively, the host country supervisor
must share information about the local
operations of foreign banks. Host

authorities also should be able to

obtain any necessary information from
the home authority. This ability to

gather information should be a
condition for giving consent for the
cross- border establishment of a bank.
The information to be shared should

encompass both qualitative and
quantitative aspects. The information

should permit the supervisors to
calculate the bank's (or banking

group's) capital adequacy ratios, large
exposures or legal lending limits, and
funding and deposit concentrations on
a consolidated basis (Song, 2004).

However, home and host authorities
need to acknowledge that prudential
standards and supervisory practices

may differ between cou n tries.

July - Sept. 2008
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Authorilies of the host state should

permit on- site inspections by the
home supervisor of a prudential

nature

of

establishments of

internationally active banks within its
jurisdictions. Together with the free
flow of data, such inspections are a

necessary corollary of effective
consolidated s u pe rvis io n. The
corporate structure of a banking
group should be transparent to the

home and parent level supervisors so
that they are able to supervise the
group effectively on a consolidated
basis. Concerns are most acute when
corporate complexity results not from
legitimate business decisions, but on
the part of the institution to thwart the

supervisor's efforts

to oversee

its

activities.
A home country supervisory authority
is responsible for supervising the
global operations of a bank or banking
group on the basis of consolidated,
verified, and prudential information.
This approach encompasses not only
bank holding companies and financial

affiliates. The home supervisory
authority has a responsibility to
safeguard the domestic financial
system by preventing the

joint ventures, and subsidiaries. A
maior responsibility ofthe parent bank

supervisor is to determine that the
parent bank is providing adequate
oversight, not only of its overseas
branches, but also its joint ventures
and subsidiaries. This parent bank
oversight should include monitoring
compliance with intemal controls,
receiving an adequate and regular
flow of information, and periodically
verifying the information received.

3.0

Country Experiences in the
Practice of Consolidation
Supervision

This section presents the practice of
consolidated supervision in seven (7)
jurisdictions, namely: the Bermuda
Monetary Authority (BMA)- Bermuda,
Federal Reserve System
USA,
Gibraltar Supervisory Authority, the
Central Bank of Philippine, Reserve

Bank

of lndia (RBl), Financial

Services Authority (FSA), UK and the
South Africa Reserve Bank (SARB).

3.1 The Bermuda

Monetary
Authority - Bermuda

ln areas of its primary supervisory
responsibility, the Bermuda Monetary

Authority (BMA) employs either

establishment in its .jurisdiction. lf the
bank or banking group is not subject
to consolidated home supervision, or
if the home supervisor does not have

consolidated supervision, depending
on the nalure of a group's business,
as a complement to supervision of

authorities should not allow any
cross- border establishment of that

bank or banking group

in

its

.iurisdictjon.

Specialproblems can be posed bythe
so-called shell banks and parallelowned banks, which do not have
physical offices but operate as visual
off-shore banks. To be effective, no
shell bank and parallel-owned
banking structure, in principle, should
be licensed because they conflict with

the Basel Committee's

Core

Principles. Furthermore, international

AMUCFT standards have called for
an explicit elimination of shell banks.
As part of practicing consolidated
banking supervision, banking
supervisors must adequately monitor
and apply appropriate prudential
standards to all operations of their
banking organizations worldwide,
including at their foreign branches,

and
management in order to evaluate
material risks to the reputation or
financial soundness of the licensed
institution. The idea is, however, not
to supervise all the companies in a
group, but to ensure that the licensed

entity is supervised as apart of its
group, particularly the relevant
financial institutions within the
structure.

The exceptions to the BMA's
consolidated supervision are:

>

qualitative or quantitative

I licensed institutions.
Consolidated supervision is
ind ivid ua

performed by liaising with the relevant
industry supervisor, if the outcome will
be a more accurate assessment ofthe

risks to which

a

licensed bank or
investment business could be
exposed. ln the process ofconducting
a q u a ntitative co n so lid ate d
supervision, specific capital ratios are
set at both the solo and consolidated
levels against which the institutions
and the group are evaluated, with the

primary focus on the licensed
institu tio n. ln cases where

quantitative consolidation

is
inappropriate, owing to the nature of

particular assets and activities
conducted in other parts of a group,

the BMA undertakes

a

qualitative

consolidatlon.

ln

carrying out the consolidation/
assessment of a group, emphasis is

usually on the group's general
business and the environment, in
which it operates, as well as its
20

Where consolidation would be
inappropriate or misleading

>

Where the assets in question

constitute less than one
percent (1%) ofthe total assets

(on and off-balance sheet ) of

-

establishment of unsupervised or
under supervised foreign banking

the capacity to perform such
supervision, the host cou ntry

controls, organization

the remainder of

the

consolidated group; and

>

Where there are legal
impediments to the transfer of
the full information required for
accounting consolidation.

3.1.1

The BMA'S Accounting
Consolidation Technique

The BMA's accounting consolidation

technique

is fu ll

consolidation

liabilities

of

line-by-line
assets and
the entities being

of all

consolidated, based on converitional
accounting rules, including netting of

balances between companies.
According to the BMA (2000), the
quantitative consolidated supervision
is based on consolidated financial

returns, reflecting an accounting
consolidation of the licensed entity
with parts or the whole of the group to
which the entity belongs.

A qualitative

consolidated

supervision could be employed in
certain cases, especially where
a cco u ntin g consolidation is
meaningless due to the nature of
particular assets and activities
conducted in other parts of the group.
For instance, where an industrial or

insurance group

is

involved,

qualitative consolidated supervision

is the most appropriate. ln this
approach, attention is focused on the

u p's general business, the
organization and management as
well as the environment in which it

gro

operates in order to evaluate material
risks to the reputation or financial
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soundness of licensed institutions. lt

also entails setting specific capital
ratios at both individual and
consolidated levels against which the

3.3 The Central Bank of investment in an insurance company
Philippines Bangko in 1999 and the introduction of
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)

of

institution and the group are

The Bank

monitored.

quasi-banks as well as their

With effect from 2003, the group- wide

Philippines has

supervisory authority over banks and

subsidiaries and affilia(es engaged in

capital adequacy and large exposure
norms are as stated below:

allied activities. However, some of
these subsidiaries and affiliates of

.

securities dealers and brokers,
finance companies and insurance

Capital Adequacy

-

Each

financial institution is expected
to maintain a minimum capital

to risk- weighted assets

ratio

(CRAR) of 9% on an ongoing

.

Secu rities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and the Office of

the lnsurance

Large Exposure
ln addition to prudential limits on

was conducted separately

Commission under

relevant laws. Under the original set

group-wide level should also

adhere

to the

f

ollowing

up, examination of any banking group

and

without any coordination by several
departments under the Supervision
and Examinalion Section of the BSP
and the SEC's capital market

prudential limits on an ongoing
basis.

development and regulation,
according to the type of financial

Single borrower exposure

institution (BSP, 2000).

should not exceed 10% of the

The BSP shifted to a consolidated
supeNision of banks by adopting
some elements of consolidation of
Accounts of banking groups in '1998
and imposed a common cut-off date

group's capitalfund.

.

companies are primarily regulated by

the

basis.

exposure by solo entities,
financial institutions at the

.

banks, including investment houses,

Group

r

borrowe
exposure
should not exceed 30% of the

group's capital fund or up to
40% of capital fund ofthe group
provided the additional 10%
exposure is for the purpose of

financing infrastructure
projects.

3.2 The Federal

Reserve

System, USA

The Federal Reserve System has
supervisory oversight function and
authority over bank holding
companies (BHCs) that operate as
financial holding companies (FHCS)
and for the BHCS that are not FHCS.
Supervisory effort is focused on
consolidated or group-wide analysis
of an organization. The objective is to
ensure that the holding company does

not threaten the viability of

its

depository- institutions' subsidiaries,
by focusing on the financial strength

and stability of FHCs, their
consolidated risk management
process, intemal policies, reports,
procedures and overall capital
adequacy. The Federal Reserve
System supervises bank holding

companies, while depository
institution subsidiaries

supervised

by their

of

primary bank supervisors.

FHCS are

appropriate

for the examination of banks and their

subsidiaries and affiliates under BSP
supervision. Nonetheless, what this

still means is that only

bancassurance, strong coordination

between BSP and

the

lnsurance

Commission is also critical. lt should
be noted that insurance companies
are excluded when computing for the

consolidated risk-based capital
adequacy ratio.

3.4

G

ibraltar

Su

perviso ry

Authority, Gibraltar
Consolidated supervision is defined
by the Authority to mean a qualitative
assessment ofthe overall strength of a
group to which a licensed institution
belongs. lt involves the evaluation of

the potential impact of other group
companies on the licensee. This
principle is adopted whenever a
licensed institution is a member of a
wider group to complement solo
supervision of the licensee.
The assessment is based on a number

of

inf

ormation, including the

consolidated returns on the activities
of the group's companies excluded
from the consolidated returns due to
the inappropriateness of inclusion of
such entities. For instance, industrial

and insurance companies are
excluded from the consolidation.

Activities of the group companies are

taken into account to the extent that
they have material influence on the

subsidiary/affiliate banks and quasi-

reputation and financial soundness of

banks are examined, not subsidiaries

the licensed institution. The purpose of

and affiliates that are not banks or
quasi-banks. The latter are only
req u ired to submit financial
statements that form part of the
consolidated report.

Prudential regulations such as the
single borrower's limit are, however,
applied on a solo basis, except for the

required compliance with the riskbased capital ratio and the lifnit on the
net foreign exchange position.
Besides, the BSP and SEC signed a
memorandum of u nde rstand ing
(MOU) in JUly 2002, outlining
cooperative arrangements to more

efficiently share supervisory

responsibilities and information for
those entities that fall under the
jurisdiction of both agencies. In
particular, the MOU gave the BSP full
regulatory powers over investment

houses that are subsidiaries and/or
affiliates of banks. With the lifting of
the limit on a universal bank's equity

2t

consolidated supervision is not to
supervise all the companies in the
group, but to supervise the bank as
part of its group. This is complemented

with

reg u lar discussions with
members of the group's management
who have responsibility for the overall
group position.

The Authority usually carries out
consolidation in cases when the
licensee is the parent company of
firms which conduct one or more
financial activities such as lending,
ancillary banking services, flnancial
leasing, money transmission services;

and when the licensee is a part of a
group or sub-group whose business,
wholly or mainly, comprises lending,

ancillary banking services, financial
leasing, money transmission services
and the parent company is itself a
financial institution (Kennedy, J. and
Jim Dowd, (1999).
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3.5

Reserve Bank of lndia (RBl)

The supervisory framework for
consolidated supervision consists of
three components:

.

Consolidated Financial

Statement (CFS), which are
intended for public disclosure
and for market discipline;

.

Consolidated prudential returns
(CPR) meant for supervisory
assessment of risks and may
be transmitted to other banks
byother group members; and

.

Application of prudential
regulations such as capital
adequacy, large exposures and
liquidity gaps on group wide
basis.

As part of the implementation of
consolidated supervision, the RBI
prescribes the group-wide prudential
norms for capltal adequacy and large
exposures for financial institutions.
The prescription which is done on an
on-going basis takes into account the

assets and liabilities

of

their

subsidiaries/associates in addition to

compliance by the financial

institutions/subsidiaries/associates
with prudential norms that may be
applicable to them on solo basis.

3.6

practice is for one UK supervisor from
among that responsible supervision
of the different authorized entities
within a group to be appointed as its

lead supervisor, based on
'predominant business test'. The lead
supervisor for the purpose of
consolidated supervision should
facilitate information sharing among
its supervisors, assess the adequacy
risks
concentrations and conduct a broader
qualitative assessment of risks across
the group. The lead supervisor's

of the group's capital and
methodologies

activities from the operations of the
monetary policy through the creation
of the Financial Services Authority
(FSA). This is a single regulator thal
covers banking, securities and
insurance. lt is therefore, operating a

consolidated financial regulatory
system. The FSA operates as a
private company which discharges a
public function and has regulatory
power through statute. lt does not rely
on the governmentfor its funding. The
regulator is independent of the Bank
of England and therefore independent
ofthe government.

The FSA adopts the use of

lead
supervisor for coordinating the efforts
of all the regulators of the financial
groups and report its findings to the
FSA. This had since '1999 helped it to
develop a more integrated approach

supervising both financial

for achieving the

above roles include

a

understanding and evaluation across
business
strategy; management capabilities

and policies; and adequacy of its
resources, both in the UK and
overseas.

lead supervisor include:

Overall assessment

of

the

group risks taking a consensus
on key riskswithin the group,

.

A

co-coordinated supervisory
programme, which is aimed at

to meet its
objectives, avoid duplication
assisting the FSA

and deploying resources more
effectively and efficiently to high
risk areas.

.

niform approach

to

flnancial

regulation and supervision in terms of
objectives, principles and standards,

especially to consider the need for
consolidated s u perv is ion. The

consolidated supervision in South
Africa is concerned mainly with the
assessment of capital adequacy and
formulation of an appropriate
approach to the supervision of
financial conglomerates or banking
groups which provide services in the
banking, securities and insurance

sectors and cross-border
establishments of banking
institutions.

4.0 The Relevance of
Consolidated Supervision
in the Nigerian Banking
Sector

The adoption of universal banking in
Nigeria in 2001 has brought about
the
add ition
challenges

to

al

Regulatory Authorities. Under the

scheme, banks are allowed to

The Three key responsibilities of the

.

u

proper

the group, including the

Financial Services Authority
(FSA), United Kingdom

Since 1997, the United Kingdom (UK)
has reformed its financial system by
separating its banking supervision

to

institutions and their subsidiaries in
the UK .However, this method does
not affect the responsibilities of the
solo supervisors. The general

Central Point

of

Contactusually the lead supervisor is
the manager responsible for
shortening the communication
lines and response time
between the FSAand groups

undertake various financial service
activities, which cut across both
money and capital markets as well as
insurance business. Furthermore, the

recently concluded banking sector
consolidation programme through
mergers & acquisitions and the
increased capitalization of banks,
have resulted in the emergence of
mega banks in the country, leading to
increased competition within the
seclor as well as
heightened

a

appetite by banks to become
internationally active, particularly
within the West African sub region,
including Europe and America
(CBN/NDIC Technical Committee on
Supervision, 2007).
Consequently, financial institutions in
N

igeria have expanded their

These responsibilities are employed

activities. often through subsidiaries

to evaluate the group wide risks within
the areas specified above.

operation. Financial groupings have

3.7

Af rica Reserve
Bank/Financial Services

South

Board (SARB/FSB)
As part of South Africa's development
of financial regulation and bank

supervision, the policy Board for
Financial Services and Regulation
was established in 1993 to, among
other functions, coordinate the
financial regulation policies in respect
of the entire financial sector. The

coordination is aimed at achieving a
22

beyond their traditional areas of
thus emerged, combining banking,
insurance, pension funds, discount
houses, finance companies, primary
mortgage in stitu tio n
and
microfinance banks and securities

s,

businesses. The above

developments have exposed the
limitations of the solo approach to
supervision, particularly in
addressing the following concerns:

l.

Contagion risk the possibility
that problems in one part of the
group may affect other entities
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within the group;

comments and subsequent

functional regulators,

I

adoption.

consistent with the applicable

Complex nature of
banking entities

-

banks

have become more
complex and less-]
transparent with some of
them having overseas
branches/affiliates/subsidi
aries and, therefore, more
difficult to manage than

institutions with more
clearly defined mandate

and more specific focus. A

network of complex and
overlapping managerial
and operational structures

within a single
cong

lomerate further

accentuate the problem as
risk diversification and
risk-spreading arising out
of this would also raise

issues regarding risk
management and risk
based supervision that

may not be easy
address

in a

to
sectoral

regulatory paradigm.; and

I

Arbitrage opportunities

usually created by
differing regulations and
su pervision standards
among supervisory

agencies which may be
occasioned by limitations

of the segmental

approach to supervision
as each ofthe subsidiaries
in the group is supervised
on a "solo basis" by the
agency that oversees its
sector of operation. The
supervision of related
entities on "solo basis"

obscures
inte rdepe nd en

Consolidated Supervision of Banks in

Nigeria discusses the processes of
supervising banking groups and their

cross-border establishments

of

lnsurance Corporation (NDIC). The

framework e nco m pass the
supervision of banking group and
financial conglomerates. The
proposed consolidated supervision
approach forthe Nigerian banks is the
soio-plus approach. ln that regard,
the supervision of banks on a solo
basis by the CBN and NDIC shall be
complemented by a quantitative and
qualitative assessment of the banking
group in order to assess the potential
impact of other members of the group
on the operations of the supervised
bank.

As noted earlier, consolldated
supervision is a relatively new
approach for supervising financial
institutions. lt goes beyond the
examination ofthe balance sheet and
conventional financial ratios of an
individual bank and considers issues

5.0 The Challenges of
Consolidated Supervision

The Basel Committee on

Banking

Supervision has developed principles
relevant for the supervision of banking
and insurance groups as well as
f ina ncia
conglomerates. These

I

principles emphasise the need for
prudential supervision to be
conducted at both the "solo" and
consolidated levels, and to address a
number of key issues in supervising
such groups. Banks which form part of

corporate groupings present
supervisors with a number of

challenges which do not occur, or are
usually less significant, in the case of
single entity banks. The following are
some ofthe issues and challenges:

This is primarily the risk that financial
difficulties encountered by a member
of a group can endanger the financial
stability of a bank in the same group.

at its

stage of development, is
desirable because it will assist the

CBN and other regulators/

supervisorsto:

.:.

Obtain information on the
institutions being supervised/
regulated through information
developed by other relevant

domestic and foreign

.i.

Assess the strength of a group

to

a

which

This problem is probably more when a
bank has credit exposure to related
companies and their ability to repay
the bank is threatened. News of losses
or falling profits in such companies
weakens depositors' confidence in the
bank and brings it under liquidity

pressure. Loss of confidence,
resulting in liquidity pressure, may
also be triggered by non- financial
causes, such as reports that the

belongs in order to assess the
potential impact of other group

management or staff of related nonbank companies have been involved
in illegal or unethical business

companies

practices (MacDonald,

Nigerian bank

on the bank in

1

998).

question.

.:.

Focus attention on material
risks from activities that are not

supervised by another

and the Nigeria Deposit

for

long way in addressing the

regulatory and supervisory challenges
in the Nigerian financial sector.

management, among others. The
adoption of such a framework in the
Nigeria's linancial sector, particularly

consolidated

to the industry

a

Contagion

supervisors

lnsurance Corporation (NDIC)
have developed a consolidated
supervision framework and the
exposure draft has since been

Seen in this light, there is no doubt lhat
is relevant
for Nigeria and its adoption has
become imperative. lt is hoped that the
frameworkwhen fi nally adopted will go

consolidated supervision

such as a bank's group-wide quality of

the

supervision of banks in Nigeria
has become imperative. The
Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN)

issued

a

(CBN) and the Nigeria Deposit

existwithin groups.

adoption

as

complement to the solo supervision of
banks by the Central Bank of Nigeria

cies that

Against the background of the
aforementioned developments
in the Nigerian banking sector
and the need to embrace
international best practice, the

laws.

The proposed framework for

supervisor or regulator, or that
cut across legal entities; and

.:.

Have a platform for the sharing

of information among local and
foreign supervisors and other
23

CapitalAdequacy

Another major challenge posed by
consolidated supervision is that of
agreeing on the methodology for
measuring g rou p-wid e capital
adequacy. ln most jurisdictions,
group-wide capital requirements are
determined on a case-by- case basis
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(chapman, 2007). The key issue here
is to ensure that capital is adequate at
both the "solo" and consolidated
group levels.

Group exposures

to

particular

counterparties
Banks in most countries are subject to

regulations which limit their credit

exposure to an individual
counterparty (or group of related

it is also
important to limit the size of individual
large exposures incurred by banking

counterparties). However,

groups. lndeed, without the
application of large exposure limits to
banking groups, individual banks can
easily circumvent the limits which

apply to themselves. There is
therefore need to ensure that
a pp ro priate controls over
concentrations and intra-group
transactions are in place for effective
consolidated supervision.

Transparency

of

managerialstructures

lega

I

and

Business groups frequently have
highly complex structures, which
make the effective supervision of
banks situated within such groups
more difficult. Moreover, the legal and
managerial structures of a group may

difier, particularly when a group has
adopted matrix management under

Risk Management

information on a voluntary basis from

lntegrated operations of consolidated

the bank in question. Nevertheless,
there may also be occasions when

tinancial institutions usually result to

increased operational risks

as

it

reduces transparency and increases
the potential for risk management
errors. lntegration also tends to make
the risks of consolidated institutions
harder for supervisors to measure,
since risk transfer techniques become

other group companies are unwilling

or unable to supply the

required

information to the bank for onward
transmission to the supervisors. To
overcome this problem it is essential

that the supervisory authority has
legal powers to obtain information.
They can be a particular problem in
or
subsidiaries since legal powers to

more complex and create new
interdependencies in group risk

the case of foreign parents

profiles.

obtain information may have no
valid ity in foreign jurisdictions.

Quality of Management
ln caseswhere a group is headed by a

non- bank parent company, the
directors and shareholders of the
parent company have effective
control over any bank in their group,
by virtue ofthe parent's legal power to
remove the bank's board of directors,
and for this reason it can be assumed
that the directors of the subsidiary
bank will normally act in accordance
with their wishes. Therefore, in such
situations there is a risk that a bank
will be "de facto" controlled by
persons who may lack the necessary
skill or integrity to act as directors of a
bank. ln practice, this problem may be
resolved if supervisors have a legal
duty to vet the suitability ofall persons
and entities which have the ability,

Supervisors should therefore always
establish that there will be no barrier
to the flow of such information before

they allow their banks to open
establishments abroad or grant
authorization to new banks with
foreign ownership.

Moral hazard

When practicing consolidated
supervision, supervisors have to take
care not to give the impression that
the activities of a whole group are

being supervised, even if only
informally. This is pa rticu la rly

important in the case of mixed activity
groups. "Moral hazards" can arise if
the management of non- bank
companies come to believe that the

on

directly or indirectly, to exercise
control or significant influence over

supervisory authorities will give them
support- in the event of financial

particular aspects of their work to a
range ofdir€ctors or senior managers

the operations of a bank. lt may also
be resolved if the parent company is

based in other group companies and,

prepared

problems weakening depositors'
confidence in a related bank.

sometimes, in other countries. Such
anangements must be thoroughly
analyzed by supervisors in order to
idenliry lines of accountability within

It is therefore important that the
supervisors establish the precise
degree of independence which has

which staff members report

the group. ln the most worrying cases
groups may have deliberately chosen

a

complex structure in order to
obscure their operations or true
ownership, and thereby avoid

efiective supervision of their activities.
To allow for effective group-wide
supervision, the structure of a

corporate group involving any

regulated entities must be sufficiently
transparent for prudential regulators

to be able to ascertain where the
various business lines are conducted,
the risk profile of the group and its

indMdual parts, the way in whicfl
internal risk management is
organized and conducted, and what
corporate, financial and other
linkages that exist among group
members.

to devolve management
autonomy to the bank's own directors.

been given to the directors of such a

bank and are informed in good time
about any changes which the parent
company makes to its controls over
the bank. Directors of a non- bank
parent company may sometimes be

exposed to serious conflicts of
interest and inclined to favor the

difficulties- in order to prevent their
Similarly, business counterparties of
non- bank companies may also take
greater risks than normal in their
dealings with such companies if they

of official
support for an entire group. ln short,
the perception that official support is
likely- should the group get into
difficulties- willtend to weaken mdket
discipline.
perceive the likelihood

6,0

Concluding Remarks

interests of the non- bank companies

This paper has shown that

which they control to the detriment of

consolidated supervision has much in
common with the normal supervision

the banKs depositors.

Right

of Access to

being practiced
Prudential

at the level of

lnfomation

individual banks. lts main importance
lies in the rocognition that banking

ln

and oth€r frianciel ac{ivities are not
always confined within the balance

order

to

supervis€ efiec{ively
supervisors may from time to time
require information about rBlated nonbank companies. Very often it may be
possible for them to obtain such
24

sh€et

of thqse particular entities

which have been licens€d as banks.

Rather,

it entails an overall

evaluation, both quantitatively and
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sheet

qualitatively, of the strength ofa group
to which a bank belongs, in order to

business off-balance

assess the potential impact of other

participations. At the same time, the
gradual erosion of traditional barriers
between different types of financial
institutions (banks, security firms,

group companies on the bank.

As the flnancial markels continue to
develop new instru ments and
techniques, it is likely that banks will
increasingly conduct parts of their

through

subsidiary companies

and

insurance companies etc) will also
aller the structure of the businesses
which provide financial services. The

opening of domestic financial markets
to foreign participants will have a
similar effect. Bank supervisors must

respond to the challenge of these
developments for banks and the
traditional risks they represent for the
depositors by adopting consolidated
supervisory oversight of the group to
which the bank belongs.
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